Obama and Afghanistan: Deciding vs. Deliberating

“The strongest of all warriors are these two: Time and Patience.”
– Leo Tolstoy

“I’m the decider,” former President George Bush famously uttered in April of 2006. “I decide what is best. And what’s best is for Don Rumsfeld to remain as the Secretary of Defense.” Bush’s use of the term “decider” captures the essence of his Administration’s approach to governing: making “right decisions” as opposed to making decisions the right way. And, as has been ably chronicled by Bob Woodward and numerous others, Bush’s “right decisions” were often Texas-cowboy-shoot-from-the-hip-and-ask-questions-later-gut-feelings-of-rightness decisions.

How refreshing it has been, then, to see President Obama engage in a deeply deliberative process over whether to commit more U.S. troops to the war in Afghanistan. Though accused of “dithering” over war strategy by former Vice-President Dick Cheney, Obama’s expected decision to commit 30,000 more troops to the war will actually bring him more into line with conservatives than the rank-and-file of his own party. But the thoroughness and transparency of Obama’s process will lay the foundation for support in Congress, support that will be essential given the increasing unpopularity of the war.

President Obama’s approach exemplifies key “design principles” that research has revealed to be fundamental to effective executive decision-making:

Gather the right minds around the table. Decision-making is a process of converting inputs (knowledge, insight, potential support) into outputs (commitments and plans of action). As with all processes, the old maxim that “garbage in equals garbage out” very much applies to decision-making. You can’t hope to get the right outcomes if you don’t start with the right inputs. That’s why gathering the right minds around the table is key. These minds must have the requisite range of expertise (knowledge of Afghan regional politics, counter-insurgency strategy, etc), range of opinion (both for and against committing more troops), as well as a range of cognitive orientation — creative minds and practical minds, analytical and values-driven, structured and flexible. As you decide whom to have at your decision-making table, then, keep in mind Machiavelli’s admonition that, “The first opinion which one forms of a [leader] is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise.”

Decide how you will decide. When the stakes are high, it’s all too easy for decision-making to degenerate into positional bickering. When this happens, opportunities to reframe the problem, generate creative alternatives, and forge consensus agreements are lost. The result is either lowest-common-denominator comprises or deadlock. Effective executives avoid this by adopting structured approaches that parse decision-making into a set of distinct phases, starting with defining the problem, and proceeding through establishing criteria for evaluating potential outcomes, generating and testing alternatives, and finally reaching closure. The virtue of the phased approach is that it moves people through digestible experiences of education and adjustment, blunting the reflexive resort to position-taking, and avoiding premature convergence on an “obvious” solution.

Take care to define desired outcomes early (and don’t lose sight of them). This is a corollary to the previous principle. One well-documented decision-trap is the tendency for the scope of decision-making either to expand dangerously (this is known as mission creep) or to get watered down (laboring mightily and giving birth to a mouse). The best antidote to scope drift is early definition of, and commitment to, a statement of desired outcomes. Is the goal in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban, and if so, over what time frame? Is it building civil society with the Afghan people? Is it buttressing stability in Pakistan? Is it getting U.S. troops home as quickly as possible? The resulting mission statement, along with supporting criteria for rigorously evaluating potential outcomes, provides an essential anchor for the hard work of option generation and deliberation.

Rest the ladder of inference on a firm foundation. The most dangerous things in the world are outdated assumptions. Assumptions, after all, are the foundation upon which the ladder of logical inference rests in decision-making. If “A” is true, “B” and “C” follow. But what if “A” is not true? What if “A” was once true, but no longer holds? For example, is Al Qaeda still the primary threat to U.S. interests in the region? It’s essential to explicitly surface the fundamental assumptions that the people around the table are making, and to test their soundness with deep analysis. Done well, the result is a shared foundation of facts and hypotheses on which the group will build their decision-edifice.

Demand diversity of viewpoints. In Why Great Leaders Don’t Take Yes for an Answer, Michael Roberto persuasively argues that leaders must actively foment disagreement to get good decisions. Too much agreement, too early in the process, is as dangerous as too little agreement later on. Why? Because it raises the specter that decision-makers have fallen prey to groupthink, the tendency for “conventional wisdom” to harden too quickly and crowd out divergent opinions. If leaders don’t get enough disagreement naturally, Roberto suggests, then they should demand it by elevating the options of thoughtful minority viewpoints, or appointing a devil’s advocate (Vice President Biden appears to have played this role in arguing for a more limited focus in the region) or engaging in scenario generating exercises or setting up a “red team” and a “blue team” to argue different viewpoints.

Know when and how to bring the process to closure. Finally, effective leaders know when and how to drive the process to closure and commitment. “Analysis paralysis” is an ever-present danger when potential outcomes are unpalatable. Deliberation can give way to dithering when the stakes are high and interests are powerful. So decision-makers like Obama have to set deadlines and other action-forcing events to bring the process to a conclusion. They must demand that everyone around the table support the outcome, even if there is not full consensus that it is the right way to go.

These principles of effective executive decision-making will help you to avoid the more obvious decision-traps and reach better conclusions. In the case of President Obama’s deliberations on Afghanistan, his careful attention to the design of the decision process should contribute to saving lives and increasing our security.

Michael Watkins is the author of many books, including Shaping the Game: The New Leader’s Guide to Effective Negotiating and Your Next Move: The Leader’s Guide to Navigating Major Career Transitions